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DECISION THEORY AND DUE PROCESS:





In its 1987 decision in Martin v. Ohio,' the United States
Supreme Court again engaged in lawmaking for burdens of proof.
Although the Court ratified the state's rule in this case,2 the Court
has, in the past, prescribed different rules as requirements of due
process.3 The Court has justified its lawmaking by asserting that the
burden of proof should apportion the risks of error in a way that
favors the more important interests at stake in the trial. 4 If an erro-
neous finding of fact F would harm one set of interests more than an
erroneous finding of not-F would harm the other, the burden of
proof should lie with the party who alleges F, and the standard of
proof for F should be high enough to reduce the risk of an errone-
ous finding proportionately. This idea is founded in Bayesian deci-
sion theory,5 in which it is formalized as a rule for choice
in conditions of uncertainty. It is a cornerstone of the Court's
* J.D., Yale University, 1973; M.A., Yale University, 1973; B.A., Northwestern Uni-
versity, 1964. Preparation of this Article was facilitated by the generosity of Jeanne
Bauer.
1 107 S. Ct. 1098 (1987).
2 Under Ohio law, the accused bears the burden of proving self-defense by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence.
3 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)(requiring proof by clear and convincing
evidence for termination of parental rights); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979) (requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence for involuntary civil commit-
ment); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 628 (1975) (requiring that the prosecution bear the
burden of proof on the issue of provocation); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)(requir-
ing proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the crime).
4 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755-56; Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24, 427; Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977); Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698, 700-01; WVinship, 397
U.S. at 363-64.
5 For a thorough treatment of the decision-theoretical underpinnings, see R. JEF-
FREY, THE LOGIC OF DECISION 1-76 (1965).
557
RICHARD S. BELL
due process doctrine for burdens of proof, and merits careful
examination.
This Article begins with a description of the Bayesian founda-
tions, which explain the Court's logic. It continues with a critical
examination of the elements that give substance to the logic-a pol-
icy for errors and assumptions about factfinders' evaluations of evi-
dence in trials of fact. The Court's reasoning about both of these
elements has been deficient. Next, this Article offers a more accept-
able set of assumptions and introduces a more satisfactory model of
lawmaking for burdens of proof. This model, as applied to several
due process issues, makes it plain that the Court's lawmaking has
been unsound, if not erroneous. Finally, this model is recom-
mended as appropriate for testing burdens of proof against due
process requirements.
A. THE KAPLAN FORMULA
The intellectual origin of the Court's due process doctrine for
burdens of proof appears to be Kaplan's article, Decision Theory and
The Factfinding Process.6 It starts with the assumption that evidence
about an issue of fact will never leave a rational trier of fact in a state
of perfect certainty. The trier will be able to conclude only that the
truth of a party's assertion is probable at some value ofp between 0
and 1.7
6 Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Facifinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968). See
Winship, 397 U.S. at 370-72 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Patterson, 432 U.S. at 208
(citing Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring)); Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 701; id. at
706 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
7 This assumption may seem too strong in one respect. Perhaps a factfinder at trial
cannot assign a numerical value or even a qualitative value to the probability of some
"facts," because of the logic of the concept rather than a lack of information. For exam-
ple, the question of common law negligence is said to be a question of fact, but only
because it is a question for the trier. A finding of negligence results from the application
of a legal rule or standard to facts, such as facts about the defendant's conduct. See
generally 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 97-103 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
Although there is no difficulty in applying the concept of probability to the facts
about defendant's conduct, the concept has no clear application to a finding that this
conduct was or was not negligent. The trier's doubt about whether the defendant's con-
duct was negligent cannot sensibly be treated as doubt about likelihood. If the trier is in
doubt, it is because the facts are on the margin of his conception of reasonable care.
The trier must decide whether the defendant who acted in this way used reasonable care
by applying his understanding of what is reasonable. This is not a decision that further
information could help, as further evidence would help in finding a fact, unless such
further information is about the defendant's conduct. Nor could anything show that the
trier's decision is wrong. Another decision of some higher authority could override it,
but only in adopting a standard different from the one applied by the trier. Further-
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On this assumption, Kaplan and others8 have suggested that
decision theory can provide a rule for deciding whether the trier
should find the assertion true. Suppose that the outcome of a trial is
determined by the trier's finding on P's (plaintiff's or prosecution's)
factual allegation A or, correspondingly, D's (defendant's) factual
allegation not-A. The trier's finding may be either right or wrong,9
and, if wrong, it may be an erroneous finding for D or an erroneous
finding for P. Either error would be unwanted, and so it has for the
trier an expected disutility, which equals the error's disutility multi-
plied by the probability of its occurrence. Let the disutility of an
error for P be Dp, and the disutility of an error for D be Dd. Then,
assuming that the trier wants to minimize the expected disutility of
his finding, he should find for P just in case his estimate of the
probability of A (pA) exceeds 1 divided by (1 + Dd/Dp).
The Kaplan formula'0 is an arithmetical expression of the
Court's due process doctrine for burdens of proof. It seems to pro-
vide a foundation for standards of proof that is as rational as deci-
sion theory itself. Moreover, as Kaplan points out, his analysis
seems to be supported by the standards of proof actually used in
trials of fact. " For example, if, in the ordinary civil trial, an errone-
ous finding for one party is no worse than an erroneous finding for
the other party, then Dp = Dd. Assign each variable a disutility
value of 1, and the Kaplan formula indicates that the trier should
more, it would be nonsensical to ask the higher authority about the probability that this
standard is true and the trier's standard is false.
The question of negligence, therefore, raises difficulties about more than the rela-
tion of judge and jury, which H ltmes discussed. It raises difficulties for anyone who
would treat all questions for triers as questions of fact to which answers of probability
can be given. Indeed, it raises difficulties for anyone who would suppose that the com-
mon law standards of proof are applicable to the issue. See Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable
Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REv. 307, 315-16 (1920).
The assumption that factfinders can assign some numerical value to the probability
of a fact must be taken literally. Trials of the issue of negligence fall within the assump-
tion only if the actual conduct of someone is in dispute and the standard of reasonable
care is given by the doctrine of negligence per se, a rule of law, or a clear application of
the Hand formula. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
8 See Cullison, Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding: A Preliminary Outline of the
Subjective Approach, 1969 U. TOL. L. REv. 538.
9 Of course, the trier's finding, if reasonable, is by convention always correct. There
is good reason for this convention. See Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and
Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. REv. 807, 808 (1961). But institutional fact may not corre-
spond to actual fact. Some theoretical discussions ignore!this obvious truth. G. TUL-
LOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW 57 (1971). Furthermore, people may even deny it for
various causes. See id. at 37. Such an approach is fatal to an understanding of burdens
of proof.
10 See Kaplan, supra note 6, at 1071-72.
t Id. at 1072-73.
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find for plaintiff only when pA is greater than .50. Notice that "p =
.50+" is just the numerical expression of "more likely than not,"
which is, in turn, a widely-accepted interpretation of the common
law standard of proof for ordinary civil trials-the preponderance of
the evidence.' 2 On the other hand, if, in the ordinary criminal trial,
an erroneous conviction is deemed much worse than an erroneous
acquittal, Dp is much greater than Dd. With appropriate numerical
values for these variables, the Kaplan formula indicates a standard
of proof for criminal trials that is very much higher than .50. The
common law standard of proof for criminal trials-beyond a reason-
able doubt-actually is thought to be very much higher than the civil
standard of proof.13 Thus far, then, application of the Kaplan
formula has some appealing results.
B. WEIGHING RELATIVE INTERESTS
These results, it seems, have caused the Court to accept the
Kaplan formula as a principal ground of rulemaking for standards of
proof.14 However, rulemaking by the formula is problematic. The
formula does not rationalize any particular standard of proof unless
12 Id. at 1072. See also Burnett v. Reyes, 118 Cal. App. 2d 878, 880, 256 P.2d 91, 93
(1953); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 1(5) comment para. (5) (1942); C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 339 (3d ed. 1984); E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 84-85 (1956);
Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REV. 391, 400 (1956); McNaughton, Burden of Pro-
duction of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1385-87
(1955).
13 Kaplan, supra note 6, at 1073.
14 One need not believe that the Court actually calculates with the Kaplan formula.
As an arithmetical expression of the Court's due process doctrine, the Kaplan formula is
the logic of its lawmaking. To discuss use of the Kaplan formula, therefore, is to discuss
the Court's reasoning about standards of proof.
It is not clear that Kaplan himself would approve this use of his formula. He seems
to be of two minds about it. On the one hand, he repeatedly suggests that his model has
application to the particular decision of a factfinder, rather than the decisions of a
lawmaker. See, for example, his remarks on "the typical decision-theory problem," id. at
1065, "expected utility of a decision," id. at 1068, the "criminal trial," id. at 1070, what
"the jury must feel" in order to convict, id. at 1071, and "designing ... a proper ma-
trix," id. at 1080. Kaplan confirms these suggestions when he states that
[i]n a criminal trial, as in any decision process, we must consider the utilities associ-
ated with differing decisions of the particular case at issue-not just the average
utilities over many disparate types of criminal cases. Thus the rational factfinder
should consider the disadvantages of convicting this defendant of this crime if he is
innocent as compared with those of acquitting him if he is guilty.
Id. at 1073-74 (emphasis in original).
On the other hand, Kaplan also suggests that his model has application to decisions
that are ordinarily associated with lawmaking. Thus, immediately after saying that the
rational factfinder should consider the relative disutilities of erroneous verdicts for "this
defendant" charged with "this crime," he illustrates with a distinction between two types
of crimes, embezzlement and child molestation, rather than two particular cases. Id. at
1074. He may intend to caution against the blanket use of one standard of proof in
560 [Vol. 78
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values are assigned to the variables Dp and Dd. These values alone
determine the standard of proof to be adopted.1 5 The Court may
well see ordinary civil trials, in which money or property is at stake,
as cases in which one party's gain and other's loss are commensu-
rate. In rulemaking for such cases, any values may be assigned to
Dp and Dd, provided that they are equal, and the Kaplan formula
indicates the traditional standard of proof.
On the other hand, the Court has adopted standards of proof
that are supposed to be higher than .50+ or the preponderance of
the evidence. It has required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
criminal trials and proof by clear and convincing evidence in some
special non-criminal trials.16 But neither of these standards has
been justified by the Court's declaration that disutilities of errors in
such trials have any particular values. To declare only that Dp ex-
ceeds Dd is only to justify some standard of proof higher than .50+.
It is not to justify any one of the possibilities.
Of course, the Kaplan formula works both ways, so the values of
Dp and Dd can be ascertained if the standard of proof is given. A
survey of federal judges found that they tend to associate "clear and
convincing evidence" with a probability of .75 and "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" with a probability of .90.17 By these equivalences,
criminal trials. However, distinction among types of offenses is appropriate for legal
rules, and Kaplan's point seems a more fitting consideration for a lawmaker.
Furthermore, Kaplan argues that inequalities of the disutilities of errors explain
some legal requirements of higher standards of proof-proof by clear and convincing
evidence in trials of fraud and proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. Id. at
1072-73. It is natural to understand Kaplan as implying that lawmakers do or ought to
apply his formula directly to the problem of "Determining the Probability Necessary to
Return a Verdict" (title of the section in which these arguments appear). Id. at 1071.
Finally, though Kaplan justifies the vagueness of "beyond a reasonable doubt" by
its permitting decisions that serve concrete policies for individual cases, he recognizes
that "beyond a reasonable doubt" is supposed to describe a higher standard of proof
than either "the preponderance of the evidence" or "clear and convincing evidence"
and, thus, that it imposes some legal limit on the minimum value of pA for a guilty
verdict in any case. Id. at 1037-77. This is to recognize that the standard of proof serves
as a rule.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has understood Kaplan as offering a
technique for fashioning a rule of procedure. Other readers have understood him in the
same way. See, e.g., Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1378 (1971).
15 Decision theorists may take an alternative approach, assigning values to correct
findings as well as erroneous ones. See, e.g., R. JEFFREY, supra note 5, at 75-76; Cullison,
supra note 8, at 564-66. This alternative approach may serve a special purpose. See
Tribe, supra note 14, at 1379 n.161. However, the Court has only hinted at this ap-
proach. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769; Winship, 397 U.S. at 367-68.
16 See supra note 3.
17 McCauliff, Burdens of Proof. Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guar-
antees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1325, 1328, 1332 (1982). See also McNaughton, supra
1987]
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the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt implies that
Dp is deemed about ten times worse than Dd, and the requirement
of proof by clear and convincing evidence implies that Dp is about
three times worse than Dd. One could assume that the Court, in
adopting higher standards of proof, has assigned corresponding val-
ues to Dp and Dd, but that would be speculation. There is no evi-
dence that the Supreme Court Justices agree with the average
federal judge in their numerical translations of the common law
standards.
Even if one speculates in this way, the Court's lawmaking is
problematic. To use the Kaplan formula in appropriate circum-
stances is logical. But logic is vacuous; it is the mere form of reason-
ing. Although substance is supplied by evaluating Dp and Dd,
reasons for the evaluations are still needed. There ought to be rea-
sons for concluding that Dp is ten times greater than Dd in criminal
trials, and that Dp is three times greater than Dd in some special
non-criminal trials. Simply inferring the Court's values from the re-
quired standards of proof is not only speculative but unsatisfying.
Of course, one may speculate further upon the reasons. Per-
haps the Court has evaluated the relative disutilities of errors in
criminal trials in light of Blackstone's principle: better that ten
guilty go free than that one innocent be convicted.' 8 This ground of
evaluation is plausible. The principle is surely part of common
political morality. Nevertheless, how should one speculate about
the Court's requirement that factual grounds for involuntary civil
commitment be proved by clear and convincing evidence? The im-
plicit evaluation of errors about defendants' mental illness, which
makes Dp three times greater than Dd, is unsupported by any obvi-
ous rationale. With the consequences in view, an erroneous finding
of mental illness may well be worse than an erroneous finding of no
such illness, but is it three times worse? Why not worse by a factor
of five or even eight? Is an erroneous finding of neglect in a pro-
ceeding to terminate parental rights also just three times worse than
an erroneous finding of no neglect? Finally, how do the traditional
notions of fairness associated with due process indicate the correct
choice of a factor?
note 12, at 1389; Simon, Judges' Translations of Burdens of Proof into Statements of Probability,
1969 TRIAL LAw GUIDE 103.
18 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234
(1978).
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C. THE APPORTIONMENT OF ERRORS
The Court's accceptance of Bayesian decision theory as a foun-
dation of due process doctrine for burdens of proof is problematic
in other respects. The Kaplan formula, with disutility values for its
variables, is supposed to indicate a standard of proof that will ap-
portion erroneous findings about fact A in some particular way.
This supposition is reasonable only if it is reasonable to assume that
triers' evaluations of evidence about A, to which the indicated stan-
dard is applied, have a certain kind of distribution along a contin-
uum. There is no reason to assume that triers' evaluations of
evidence will be distributed in such a way, and there is very good
reason to assume that they will not.
To understand the problem, imagine a program of lawmaking
for trials in which factfinders estimate the probabilities of material
facts at issue and apply numerical standards of proof that the Court
has determined by means of the Kaplan formula. On the one hand,
the Court has a policy in favor of correct decisions by factfinders.19
On the other hand, because there seems to be no feasible trial pro-
cedure that would ensure correct decisions in every case, the Court
also has policies for factfinders' erroneous decisions. These policies
correspond to the Court's estimates of the relative disutilities of er-
rors in different kinds of trials, as inferred in Section B, above. Er-
rors in criminal trials are to be apportioned so that ten guilty
defendants are acquitted for each innocent defendant convicted.
Errors in extraordinary civil trials also are to be apportioned in
favor of defendants, but at a lesser ratio of three to one. Errors in
ordinary civil trials are to be apportioned equally between plaintiffs
and defendants. 20 In furtherance of these policies, the Court has
established the standards of proof indicated by the Kaplan formula:
for criminal trials, .90 -f; for extraordinary civil trials, .75 +; and for
ordinary civil trials, .50+.21
Has the Court done what it believes it has done? Will the stan-
dards of proof apportion factfinders' errors according to the Court's
19 "[W]e must be mindful [in assessing the interests of the individual and the state]
that the function of legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions." Adding-
ton, 441 U.S. at 425. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
20 Addington, 441 U.S. at 423; Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971);
Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring).
21 In the terminology of economics, the Court's policy for errors is its rate of indiffer-
ent substitution for errors in favor of P and errors in favor of D. On the assumption that
a standard of proof will determine a rate of substitution for errors of the two kinds, the
standard of proof that will effectuate the Court's policy is the standard that determines a
rate of substitution equal to its rate of indifferent substitution.
1987] 563
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policies? Decision theory proves that factfinders who meet certain
qualifications will, in certain circumstances, arrive at final values of
pA that must be supposed to have a certain kind of distribution.22
Decision theory also proves that, if the Court's standards of proof
are applied to the values of pA in this distribution, the erroneous
findings about A are apportioned according to the Court's policies.
Allowing for some tolerable roughness, the requisite qualifica-
tions and circumstances of the factfinders have quite simple descrip-
tions. The circumstances are the factfinders' possession of full and
accurate information about the probability of A before any evidence
is received and about the probabilities that attach to each item of
evidence that is received at trial.23 The qualifications may be called
perfect, decision-theoretical rationality. For the decision theorist, a
perfectly-rational factfinder acts with Bayesian rationality. Such a
factfinder begins with the initial probability of A, which, upon re-
ceipt of each item of evidence, he modifies by application of Bayes'
Theorem until all evidence is received, and the factfinder reasons in
this way only. 24 It must be supposed that perfectly-rational and
fully-informed factfinders reach final values of pA in the wanted
distribution.
D. CONTRAINDICATIONS
However, decision theory provides no endorsement of the
Court's lawmaking unless factfinders are indeed fully informed and
perfectly rational. There is every reason to assume that they are
neither. Indeed, the actual process of cumulating evidence at trials
is far from the decision theorist's ideal. One may accept some very
general propositions of the Bayesian model,25 but find that it fails as
"a quantitative description of the ordinary process of weighing
evidence." 26
22 The "must" here expresses the compulsion of reason.
23 Failure to produce a possible item of evidence is treated as evidence about A in
this connection.
24 A clear account of Bayesian reasoning is found in Kaplan, supra note 6, at 1083-91,
and in Tribe, supra note 14, at 1350-58.
25 See, e.g., Ball, supra note 9, at 829.
26 L GOOD, PROBABILITY AND THE WEIGHING OF EVIDENCE § 6.1 (1950). Thus, sup-
pose the testimony of nineteen witnesses supports A, but the testimony of twenty wit-
nesses supports not-A. Given special assumptions-that the prior probability of A is
exactly .50, that the probability of truthfulness is greater than .50 and equal for all
witnesses, and that witnesses' credibilities are independent-it may be unreasonable to
think that A is at least as probable as not-A. See Ball, supra note 8, at 824-25, 852-58;
Trickett, Preponderance of Evidence, and Reasonable Doubt, 10 FORUM 75, 77-78 (1906).
However, there is no good reason to suppose that such special assumptions would be
made in all or, for that matter, any actual trials. For a thorough critique of the mathema-
[Vol. 78564
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Whether, and to what extent, factfinders in trials approximate
the Bayesian ideal are unanswered empirical questions. But, empiri-
cal studies have indicated that such approximation is, at best,
slight.27 Furthermore, the empirical studies agree with considered
opinions on the subject. It is significant, and only fair to mention,
that Kaplan is of the same mind.28 These opinions are based on
more than the familiar disagreement about the probability of some
proposition among people who have received and carefully reck-
oned with the same evidence.2 9 Factfinders are ignorant of crucial
statistical information relevant to assigning initial probabilities to
material facts at trial, and their guesses about these initial probabili-
ties can be aberrant.30
Moreover, factfinders who have such statistical information may
be unable to make proper adjustments in the initial probabilities
upon receipt of more impressionistic evidence during trial, even if
they apply Bayes' Theorem correctly. Consider, for example, the
failure of a party to produce a possible item of evidence. To make a
proper adjustment of the initial probability of the fact in light of
such failure, the trier would have to reckon with such probabilities
as are associated with the accessibility of the evidence and its rela-
tive cost to the party. The probabilities associated with cost, in turn,
depend on the resources of the party and the other demands on
those resources as determined by the party's preferences, litigation
tician's calculus of chance as applied to judicial factfinding, see L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE
AND THE PROVABLE §§ 14-39 (1977).
27 See, e.g., Edwards, Conservatism in Human Information Processing, in FORMAL REPRESEN-
TATION OF HUMAN JUDGMENT 17 (B. Kleinmuntz ed. 1968); Slovic & Lichtenstein, Com-
parison of Bayesian and Regression Approaches to the Study of Information Processing in Judgment, 6
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 649 (1971). See generally Slovic,
Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory, 28 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 1 (1977).
28 Kaplan, supra note 6, at 1084-91.
29 Tribe, supra note 14, at 1348. For a criticism of the Bayesian model that is more
technical and, in some respects, more thorough than the one offered here, see id. at
1358-68.
30 Weld & Roff, A Study in the Formation of Opinion Based upon Legal Evidence, 51 AM. J.
PSYCH. 609, 617 (1938). This is true even of judges, who should be better informed
than laymen about many such facts. For example, it has been found that only 3.5% of
the cars in accidents have mechanical defects and that mechanical defects of the cars play
a part in only .25%o of all accidents. James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident
Law, 63 HARV. L. REV. 769, 770-71 (1950). But the New York Court of Appeals has said
that "the probability that [an unexplained accident involving an automobile] occurred
from a break in its mechanism is at least equally great" as the probability that the acci-
dent resulted from a lack of care in the automobile's operation. Galbraith v. Busch, 267
N.Y. 230, 234, 196 N.E. 36, 38 (1935), discussed in Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 120
BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1951). Perhaps the concept of probability is inapplicable to




strategy, estimate of the relative effect of the evidence on the trier,
and expected value of a favorable verdict. All of these factors color
a failure to produce evidence even if it exists, but a factfinder at trial
could only be expected to apply very general commonsensical infor-
mation in giving it significance. Furthermore, no one could have
much confidence that this information will have a proper corrective
influence on a statistically-based initial probability. Finally, non-ra-
tional forces may affect triers, deliberations and impair their abilities
to give proper weight to evidence, even if the triers are fully in-
formed about the requisite probabilities. 31
Doubts about factfinders' information and rationality are mani-
fested by the various rules intended to improve their weighing of
evidence at trials. The requirements of two witnesses to treason and
corroboration of an accomplice, the binding effect ofjudicial notice,
falsus in uno,32 and rules as to attesting witnesses are straightforward
quantitative or qualitative evaluations.3 3 Some rules, most notably
the hearsay exclusion, keep evidence from factfinders because they
are deemed likely to misevaluate it.34 For much the same reason,
31 Some such possible influences are obvious; others are not. For example, research
has found that people tend to prefer a .50-.50 wager to a .25-.75 wager, although the
average return is the same in both. Edwards, Measurement of Utility and Subjective
Probability, in PSYCHOLOGICAL SCALING: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 109 (H. Bullicksen &
S. Messick eds. 1960); Edwards, Probability-Preference Among Bets with Different Expected Val-
ues, 67 AM. J. PSYCH. 56, 57 (1954); Edwards, Probability Preference in Gambling, 66 AM. J.
PSYCH. 349, 357-58 (1953); Edwards, The Reliability of Probability Preferences, 67 AM. J.
PSYCH. 68, 74-75 (1954); Edwards, Subjective Probabilities Inferred from Decisions, 69 PSYCH.
REV. 109 (1962); Edwards, Variance Preferences in Gambling, 67 AM.J. PSCYH. 441, 450-51
(1954). If the .50-.50 probability has some general psychological attraction, triers will
tend to evaluate pA at .50 even though Bayesian rigor would call for a somewhat higher
or lower evaluation. For another example of non-rational influences, see the discussion
of cognitive dissonance in Tribe, supra note 14, at 1383-84.
32 Falsus in uno,falsus in omnibus is the maxim for a rule applicable where a witness is
found to have testified falsely about one material fact. Upon request of the opponent,
the jury must be charged that it may disregard all of the witness' testimony.
33 Cleary, Evidence As A Problem In Communicating, 5 VAND. L. REV. 277, 280 (1952). Of
course, some such rules may be ill-suited to their purposes. For a criticism of one of
these rules, see Note, Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus, 29 NEB. L REV. 122 (1949).
The evaluation of evidence is extremely complicated, and common judicial sense
may go awry in the formulation of rules for this business. For example, it is often said
that an inference may not be founded on an inference and that direct evidence is
stronger than circumstantial evidence. But it is usually easier to lie directly than to fabri-
cate a convincing chain of circumstances. If the lawmaker were troubled only by the
possibility that someone had framed a criminal defendant, he should be more wary of
perjury by an "eyewitness" than an elaborate web of inculpatory circumstances. Abhor-
rence of "mere conjecture" or "speculation" is exaggerated relative to the precautions
taken with testimony; after all, cross-examination is not an acid test of truthfulness. See
generally G. TULLOCK, supra note 9, at 97-104.
34 C. McCormick, supra note 12, § 245, at 728-29; E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 248 (1963).
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other rules provide for exclusive types of proof of some facts.a5 Per-
haps the largest and most notorious family of these rules for weigh-
ing evidence are presumptions founded entirely on the probative
value of the basic facts, which lawmakers have established "to make
more likely a finding in accord with the balance of probability.- 3 6 If
lawmakers had confidence in Bayesian factfinding, they would not
adopt such rules.
Finally, the belief that factfinders are far from the Bayesian ideal
is supported not only by empirical studies and common sense, but
also by the many rules that limit the factfinders' information at trials.
Notwithstanding the probative value of hearsay evidence,3 7
factfinders may not consider it. Exclusion of relevant evidence that
is deemed too inflammatory or distracting 38 may make a net im-
provement in the triers' deliberations.3 9 But it does keep factfinders
in ignorance, and it is justified by doubts about their rationality. Ex-
clusion of evidence for reasons of policy extraneous to the factfind-
ing process, which is the work of rules of privilege,40 has the same
effect. Even where rules do not exclude relevant evidence, because
it cannot be excluded, a rule may require factfinders to ignore it.41
To the extent that they abide by the rule, the factfinders are pre-
vented from considering significant information.
The decision theorist's assurance, that fully-informed and per-
fectly-rational factfinders will arrive at such values of pA as guaran-
35 Statutes of frauds, for example, which require writings to support agreements con-
cerning certain kinds of subjects.
36 Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV.
59, 77 (1933). The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, propos-
ing change for the criminal code's presumptions, said that it is necessary to advise jurors
that the basic facts are "strong evidence of the fact presumed" because "the value of the
basic facts .. . is not readily apparent to them." 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NAT'L
COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 21 (1970). It may be said that rules
requiring only such a charge do not concern what are properly called presumptions.
Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 16
(1959). Indeed, some authorities insist that no true presumption is founded entirely on
the probative value of the basic facts. The present point is unaffected by these
objections.
37 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
38 See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 185 at 544-46.
39 Kaplan, supra note 6, at 1077.
40 C. McCormick, supra note 12, § 72. The rules of privilege are not the only mem-
bers of this class. Another is the rule of incompetency to testify as to sexual non-access
for the purpose of bastardizing an infant, which has, in some jurisdictions, been modi-
fied only by statutes in derogation of the common law and strictly construed. See, e.g.,
Sayles v. Sayles, 323 Mass. 66, 80 N.E.2d 21 (1948).
41 For example, the privilege against self-incrimination may require that a jury be
admonished against considering the criminal defendant's silence in determining the
probability of his guilt. Clearly, this requirement is not based on the proposition that his
silence is without probative value.
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tee success with the Court's standards of proof, has little relevance
to sound lawmaking practice. It would be unreasonable to assume
that factfinders are fully informed and perfectly rational.42 This may
be a fairly obvious conclusion. However, the preceding argument is
not superfluous. 43 The factors that make trials differ from the deci-
42 There are also difficulties with the alternative employment of Kaplan's formula as
a model for the particular decisions of factfinders. See supra note 14 and accompanying
text. If factfinders were to make decisions in particular cases on grounds identified by
the Kaplan formula, one formulation of the standard of proof for all trials, criminal and
civil, would have been adopted long ago. Indeed, the phrase "beyond a reasonable
doubt" would serve very well. Kaplan himself observed that the phrase has a comforta-
ble elasticity that permits factfinders to tailor the standard of proof to the varying disutil-
ities of errors in particular criminal cases. Kaplan, supra note 6, at 1073. His point has
broader application.
Decision-making bears an obvious relation to action, and rational decision-making
bears a like relation to reasonable action. Action in conditions of uncertainty about
relevant facts is action affected by doubts about the consequences, and the weights of
such doubts depend on both the estimated likelihoods of the consequences and the val-
ues attached to these consequences. See Ball, supra note 9, at 815-16. A reasonable
doubt is a doubt of such weight as to make the proposed action unreasonable. The
Kaplan formula, therefore, is a description of the logic of reasonable doubt or, more
specifically, reasonable doubt where the proposed action is a verdict with some legal
consequences. A finding of fact that is beyond a reasonable doubt is a finding that is not
affected by a doubt of sufficient weight to make the finding unreasonable.
The Kaplan formula is supposed to have general application to all trials, civil and
criminal. Therefore, if factfinders were to attach values to consequences Dp and Dd in
particular cases and follow the logic of the Kaplan formula, the beyond a reasonable
doubt formulation would be used in all trials because it expresses the Kaplan formula.
But, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction will not be used in all trials, and so
factfinders are not to make trial-by-trial applications of the Kaplan formula. Indeed,
various means are used to block or restrict such applications. See Kaplan, supra note 6 at
1074-77. The reason for these efforts to prevent factfinders' application of the Kaplan
formula is not that they are deemed incapable of doing the arithmetic. The Hand
formula is used in arguments about reasonable care, and this formula, like Kaplan's, is a
logic of action in view of probabilities and consequences. Rather, part of the reason for
these efforts may be a suspicion that factfinders in particular cases will boggle at what
seems to be a gamble with the property, and especially the liberty, of a party. See id. at
1068; Trickett, supra note 26, at 83-84. Supplying factfinders with a rule for the standard
of proof relieves them of any aversion to gambling, and introduces the broader perspec-
tive of a lawmaker who is ready and able to take responsibility for the decisions that
guide the conduct of public institutions in important affairs. However, the main reason
for using rules for standards of proof is a mistrust of policy-making by different
factfinders in particular cases. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 336, at 948. With regard
to trials, mistrust is acute because factfinders' decisions are so difficult to review.
Kaplan, supra note 6, at 1077. Furthermore, the relevant policy considerations are very
complicated. As Kaplan has observed, "the goals of our criminal system as a whole may
not only be somewhat unclear, but may also on occasion be at odds with one another."
Id. at 1076. The same may be said of our civil system. However, in any such circum-
stances, the proper policy-making institution is not the ad hoc factfinder, but rather the
lawmaker. Compare id. at 1076-77 with Tribe, supra note 14, at 1381-85.
43 For one thing, the argument has shown something about the fairly obvious conclu-
sion. It has shown that the conclusion does not merely provoke again the question what
we may assume about factfinders' behavior, but also that this renewed question is an
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sion theorist's ideal are factors that a reasonable lawmaker would
consider in establishing rules for standards of proof. They are part
of the empirical side of this rulemaking. Therefore, if the decision
theorist's ideal does not constitute an empirically-acceptable as-
sumption about the behavior of factfinders at trials, a fresh ap-
proach is needed, though the question remains the same: will the
Court's standards of proof serve its policies for errors in the various
kinds of trials?
E. MODELING EVALUATIONS OF EVIDENCE
The question is more practical than theoretical, and better for a
social scientist than a decision theorist. Nothing in the extant liter-
ature answers it, but an answer could be found. By adapting a tech-
nique described by Savage for determining the probability that
someone ascribes to a certain proposition's being true,44 the social
scientist could devise a way to instruct factfinders in applying a nu-
merical standard of proof for issue A and a way to measure the val-
ues of pA that they reach.45 Basing both the instruction for the
standard of proof and the survey questions on the same technique
makes them compatible measures of the same thing. Therefore, the
standard of proof could be compared directly to the survey data. If
the social scientist surveyed factfinders in a representative sample of
trials of issue A, the data on their evaluations of pA would be
projectable and the relative number of trials in which factfinders will
arrive at the several possible values of pA could be predicted with
confidence. Then, it could be predicted how any standard of proof
will apportion findings of A and not-A.
empirical question. Probability theory has two camps-the a priori theorists and the em-
piricists-who, respectively, ignore and celebrate the shaved die. Those who would of-
fer a theory of standards of proof constituted by the Kaplan formula alone-who would
suppose that a .90 + standard of proof results in just one conviction of an innocent for
every ten guilty verdicts-are intellectual kin to the a priori theorists. The model offered
in the following section of this Article, which takes seriously the proposition that actual
factfinding is not Bayesian, is in the empiricists' spirit. Non-Bayesian factfinders are the
shaved dice ofjudicial trials.
44 L. SAVAGE, FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1954). For two relatively informal de-
scriptions of Savage's "personalistic theory of probability," see Kaplan, supra note 6, at
1066-67, and Tribe, supra note 14, at 1346-47.
45 Both the instruction and the measurement require the factfinder to suppose an
offer of two wagers: (1) that A is true; and (2) that, in a random drawing, a white ball will
be drawn from a container of X white and Y black balls, giving suitable values to the
variables X and Y. For example, the instruction for a .50+ standard of proof would give
50-50 values and would direct a finding for plaintiffjust in case wager (1) is preferred to
wager (2). The measurement of pA would give a series of values to the variables and
would ask, for each set of values, which wager the factfinder preferred.
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1. Ordinary Civil Trials
Let A be the decisive issue of fact in some ordinary civil trials.
A finding that defendant did A gives judgment for plaintiff, and a
finding that defendant did not-A gives judgment for defendant. Re-
garding such trials, it is natural to assume that the litigants' re-
sources and abilities are approximately equal; that issue A is
genuinely controversial; and that plaintiffs are right about A in half
the cases, whereas defendants are right in the other half. At the very
least, these assumptions are supported by our ideology, whereby
Justice is blind to differences of persons and all disputes are fit to be
tried without prejudice. It is also natural to assume that the
factfinders in such trials are neither irrational in their evaluations of
evidence nor equipped with extraordinary reasoning abilities or
knowledge. On the basis of these assumptions, it is natural to as-
sume further that, if the previously-described poll of factfinders
were made, their evaluations ofpA would show the normal distribu-
tion of a continuous variable. Plotting this data on a graph might
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FIGURE 1
Call a curve like this a p-curve. As is apparent, a standard of
proof for A will divide the p-curve and apportion findings of A and
not-A in a particular way. Triers who apply a .50+ standard of
proof, for example, would find for plaintiff in about half of the cases
and for defendant in the rest. Different standards of proof appor-
tion the findings differently. But the p-curve of Figure 1 does not
show how many findings will be correct or erroneous, nor, in partic-
ular, how the errors will be apportioned.
The missing information would be available if, for each trial, it
was known whether defendant actually did A or did not-A. But that
would make nonsense of the whole enterprise, which was launched
by the contrary assumption that evidence will never cause certainty
about an issue of fact. Nevertheless, the social scientist could run a
series of mock trials, realistic in the minutest details, except that he
knows whether or not the defendant actually did A, and the defend-
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ant actually did A in just half the cases. The social scientist could
poll the factfinders and sort the p-curve data into two groups ac-
cording to the actual merits of the trials. Such data would be emi-
nently projectable and would improve the graph of Figure 1.
There is one assumption about the sorted p-curve data that
should be added to the others. It is reasonable to assume that the
mean of the values ofpA for trials in which defendant actually did A
will be higher than the mean for trials in which defendant actually
did not-A. Indeed, this assumption simply expresses our belief that
factfinders generally appreciate, to some extent, the probative value
of evidence and that trying cases can resolve factual disputes more
accurately, in the long run, than flipping a coin.
Given this assumption and certain others,46 it might be sup-
posed that a graphic display of the sorted p-curve data would look
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plays the data for trials in which defendant actually did not-A, and
the curve marked II displays the data for trials in which defendant
actually did A. Points a and b mark the mean values of pA for the
two groups of data. In accordance with our assumption about
factfinders' use of evidence, b is greater than a.
46 For example, one important assumption is that the ranges of values ofpA in the
two groups of data will overlap. This is not a dubious assumption. It is implied by
Trickett's observation that "[t]here can be evidence that fact X occurred, when it did not
occur, and evidence that fact X did not occur, when it did occur, and, for the same
reason, there can be more evidence that it occurred than that it did not occur, although
it in fact did not occur .. " Trickett, supra note 26, at 78. The shape of the curves'
slopes near the overlap is also plausible. The author of a formal model of deterrence,
after defining y as the likelihood of punishment of a person who has obeyed the law and
z as the increase in this likelihood resulting from that person's breaking the law, asserts:
"Over the relevant range not only y but also the rate of change ofy should increase as z
increases, since high levels ofz normally imply punishment of the less clearly culpable."
Birmingham, A Model of Criminal Process: Game Theory and Law, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 57, 64
(1970). The truth of this assertion is far from obvious; but, ifp-curves overlap in the way
assumed here, Birmingham's assertion is true where y and z pertain to triers' findings
that a person has broken the law.
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2. The Standard of Proof and Distribution of Findings
If the factfinders in these trials apply the .50+ standard of
proof (SOP) that the Court has adopted,47 verdicts for plaintiffs (Ps)
and defendants (D s) will be distributed in the way illustrated by Fig-
ure 3. Trials represented by the area with left-facing diagonal lines
will result in verdicts for plaintiffs, and trials represented by the area
of horizontal lines will result in verdicts for defendants. 48
SOP
(.50+) [ Findings for D
Number Findings for P
of
Trials
0 Factfinders' Values ofpA 1.0
FIGURE 3
Now consider whether the Court's policy for factfinding in ordi-
nary civil trials, which calls for a maximum of accuracy and appor-
tionment of errors equally between plaintiffs and defendants, is
served by the standard of proof indicated by the Kaplan formula. In
Figure 4, right-facing diagonal lines and vertical lines have been ad-
soP
(.50+) Correct Findings for D
!
Number Correct Findings for P
ofT Erroneous Findings for DTrials A &M1
1 Erroneous Findings for P
0 Factfinders' Values ofpA 1.0
FIGURE 4
ded to represent the numbers of erroneous findings for plaintiffs
and defendants, respectively. Inspection of Figure 4 reveals that er-
rors are apportioned equally and that any other standard of proof
would cause more errors. Therefore, it appears that the Court's
policy for factfinding in ordinary civil trials is served by the standard
of proof given by the Kaplan formula, provided that the p-curves for
such trials have certain favorable properties. Moreover, reasonable
47 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
48 Factfinding by the corporate decision of a jury calls for a minor reconceptualiza-
tion of p-curve data. It might be imagined, for example, that the measured value ofpA
for each trial is the lowest reached by a member of whatever majority is required.
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general assumptions about such trials favor the supposed configura-
tion of p-curves, so the proviso may be deemed satisfied.
3. Criminal Trials
The Court has a different policy for errors in criminal trials.
These errors are to be apportioned in a 10:1 ratio, favorable to de-
fendants. 49 To enforce this policy, the Court has adopted a .90+
standard of proof, as indicated by the Kaplan formula.50 Again, the
question is whether the Court has done what it has aimed to do.
The crucial factor is the configuration of p-curves for such trials. If
these curves have the same properties that were supposed for ordi-
nary civil trials, it is clear that the Court has blundered in setting the
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.90 + standard of proof will not yield the wanted distribution of er-
rors. The .90+ standard will cause acquittals in all the trials in
which defendants are actually innocent.5 1 But this standard will also
cause acquittals in nearly all the trials in which defendants are actu-
49 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
50 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
51 Kaplan argues that:
[i]t would be comforting to be able to say that in all cases of doubt we would acquit
rather than chance convicting an innocent man. But because no case is doubt free,
unless we decide to avoid trying anyone, we will, if we try enough people, inevitably
convict an innocent man. Moreover, we cannot avoid this by trying only a small
number of defendants. Since the chance of error, however small, is random, we
may convict an innocent man, not only in the long run but in our very first trial.
Kaplan, supra note 6, at 1071. If "we" refers to people other than triers of fact, the
confusion of subjective "doubt" with objective "chance of error," which underlies this
argument and similar arguments by many other writers, should be obvious. It may be
that "we will, if we try enough people, inevitably convict an innocent man;" but, if this is
so, it is because of the ways triers will evaluate evidence and apply standards of proof.
Furthermore, it may be that we cannot be sure that only the guilty are convicted; but, if
this is so, it is because we cannot be sure how triers will evaluate evidence and apply
standards of proof. The fact that "no case is doubt free" is hardly relevant.
Compare also the assertion of Birmingham, described supra note 46, that with con-
stant resources available for law enforcement, an increase in z will normally cause in-
crease in y. Figure 5 represents one kind of exceptional situation; it shows that z may be
increased, by reducing the standard of proof, without a resulting increase in y.
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ally guilty. Furthermore, many of these erroneous findings for de-
fendants are utterly uncompensated for by a reduction in the
number of erroneous findings against defendants. Thus, the .90+
standard of proof will not only fail to effectuate the Court's policy
for criminal trials; this standard will subvert the Court's general pol-
icy in favor of correct findings of fact and most other aims of the
criminal trial process.
The Court has not gone wrong in its general aims for criminal
trials, its policy favoring correct verdicts in such trials, or its policy
favoring ten erroneous acquittals for each erroneous conviction.
Rather, the Court has gone wrong in relying on the Kaplan formula
alone to determine generally-applicable standards of proof. That
formula may be well-suited to some needs of a one-time deci-
sionmaker who is uncertain about crucial facts and is without au-
thoritative guidance. However, it is not a dependable tool for the
lawmaker. A lawmaker who undertakes to fashion a rule that will
serve his policy for factfinding errors in a large class of trials must
reckon with the kinds of empirical considerations that underlie p-
curves. The bare Kaplan formula leaves these considerations en-
tirely out of account.
II. LAWMAKING FOR COMMON LAW STANDARDS
A. MODELING EVALUATIONS OF PROOF
Sound practice needs better theory. To that end, the preceding
model should have application in lawmaking for traditional common
law standards of proof. These standards have accepted translations
into probability values: "proved by the preponderance of the evi-
dence" means ".50+ probable"; "proved by clear and convincing
evidence" means ".75+ probable"; and "proved beyond a reason-
able doubt" means ".90+ probable".5 2 This suggests that the
probability continuum may be divided into six ranges of probability
values, and that a different common law standard of proof may be
associated with each range. For trials of any issue F, the empirical
analysis of factfinders' evaluations ofpF would allocate these evalua-
tions among the six ranges of values: (C') 0 to <.10; (B') .10 to
<.25; (A') .25 to <.50; (A) >.50 to .75; (B) >.75 to .90; and (C)
> .90 to 1.0. A factfinder who reached a value ofpF within range A
would find F proved by the preponderance of the evidence, but not
by clear and convincing evidence nor beyond a reasonable doubt;
within range B, he would find F proved by the preponderance of the
52 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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evidence or by clear and convincing evidence, but not beyond a rea-
sonable doubt; within range C, he would find F proved by any com-
mon law standard. Similarly, within range A', he would find not-F
proved by the preponderance of evidence, but not otherwise; and so
on, for ranges B' and C'. Of course, the factfinder whose value ofpF
lay within ranges A-B would not necessarily find F as a fact; nor
would a value within ranges A '-B' necessarily call for finding not-F.
A finding of F or a finding of not-F depends on the applicable stan-
dard of proof, as well as the trier's evaluation of pF.53
The common law does not identify standards of proof with
ranges of probability values, so this suggested empirical analysis is
unacceptable. Nonetheless, this analysis serves as a conceptual link
between the two models. Lawmaking for common law standards of
proof is concerned with the distribution of factfinders' evaluations
of evidence about F in all trials of the issue. But here there may be
six evaluations, rather than the indefinite number of possible values
ofpF. Evaluations of the evidence about F (Proof/F) fall on a gradu-
ated scale defined by the common law standards: preponderance of
the evidence (POE); clear and convincing evidence (CCE); and be-
yond a reasonable doubt (BRD). Factfinders evaluate Proof/F as:
(C') not-F proved BRD; or (B') not-F proved CCE; or (A ') not-F
proved POE; or (A) F proved POE; or (B) F proved CCE; or (C) F
proved BRD.54
This is the basic analysis for factfinders' evaluations of Proof/F.
A social scientist could obtain projectable data about such evalua-
tions for trials in which F actually exists and for trials in which not-F
actually exists. Furthermore, it is possible to make reasonable as-
sumptions about the data. Consider ordinary civil trials in which F
is at issue. On the assumptions about such trials that were made in
Section E. 1., supra, a graphic display of the data would take the form
of Figure 6 where six sets of p-bars show the numbers of trials in
which factfinders arrive at the several evaluations of Proof/F.
Data for the trials in which not-F actually exists are identified
with the numeral I, and data for the trials in which F actually exists
are identified with the numeral II. As is apparent, the p-bars for
issue F are similar to the p-curves for A in all relevant respects.
(Compare Figure 6 with Figure 2). Furthermore, the two forms of
empirical analysis have similar roles in lawmaking for standards of
53 The analysis does not provide for evaluation ofpF at exactly .50. This omission is
of no concern here, but cases in equipoise have significance for the model of lawmaking
and will get attention presently.
54 The special transitivity relations described in the preceding paragraph are






C' B' A' A B C
Factfinders' Evaluations of Proof/F
FIGURE 6
proof. Given the Court's policy for errors in ordinary civil trials and
the supposed data on evaluations of Proof/F, Figure 7 shows that
this policy will be enforced by requiring plaintiffs to prove F by the
preponderance of the evidence.
B. THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION
Figure 7 also shows that the Court's policy for errors in ordi-
nary civil trials will be enforced as well by requiring defendants to
prove not-F by the preponderance of the evidence. The burden of
persuasion for an issue is ordinarily treated as a simple function of
the applicable standard of proof. This burden lies with the party
who must satisfy the trier by at least the preponderance of the evi-
dence in favor of the fact.55 On this conception and the basic analy-
55 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 1; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 339, at
956-59; E. MORGAN, supra note 34, at 20; Cleary, supra note 36, at 15-16; McBaine, Burden
of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 254 (1944); Morgan, supra note 36, at 66-
67. This usage is consistent with the frequent suggestion that the burden varies in de-
gree, according to the applicable standard of proof or measure of persuasion. See, e.g.,
E. MORGAN, supra note 34, at 21-26; McBaine, supra, at 245-46, 254; Morgan, supra note
36, at 60. The suggestion, however, serves no great purpose and may cause confusion.
The burden of persuasion is sometimes called the risk of non-persuasion. E. MOR-
GAN, supra note 34, at 19; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.6 (3d ed. 1985);
920J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2485 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981 & Supp. 1986). By the
same token, the risk of non-persuasion is said to lie with the party who must convince
the trier that the fact at issue more likely than not exists. Ball, supra note 9, at 817;
McNaughton, supra note 12, at 1383. Furthermore, the various standards of proof sug-
gest that the risk of non-persuasion is a matter of degree. Id. Talk of a greater or lesser
burden of persuasion can be harmless, but talk of a greater or lesser risk of non-persua-
sion is not. It may tempt one to suppose that the party having the greater risk of non-
persuasion, in the sense of the higher standard of proof, pro lanto runs the greater risk of
losing on the issue. This supposition is false, as the model of rulemaking for standards
of proof makes plain. The risk-of-non-persuasion terminology has unambiguous sense
where the ordinary civil standard of proof is applicable in the ordinary civil trial. In such
a situation, the party who loses if the trier finds the two contradictory assertions equally
likely to be true is the party who runs a risk that the other does not. Use of "risk ofnon-
persuasion" should be limited accordingly.
There have been odd departures from the standard conception of the burden of
persuasion. It has been suggested that the burden is borne by the party who loses if the
evidence leaves the mind of the trier in equilibrium. See, e.g., McBaine, supra, at 243-44.
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sis, the burden of persuasion might be allocated to either party, with
no consequences whatsoever for the Court's policy.
By the basic analysis, only allocation of the burden of persua-
sion at a standard of proof higher than the preponderance of the
evidence will affect the distribution of findings on an issue. The
bare burden of persuasion is inconsequential. Moreover, the analy-
sis has general application. Thus, the basic analysis indicates that
the Court's lawmaking for bare burdens of persuasion in both civil
trials 56 and criminal trials57 is idle.
Of course, the basic analysis itself is founded on an assumption
about the factfinders' evaluations of evidence about an issue of fact.
It is assumed that factfinders in virtually all trials will conclude that
either F or not-F has been proved by at least the preponderance of
the evidence. The truth or falsity of this assumption is an empirical
question. If this assumption is false, then the relative number of
trials in which factfinders will conclude that neither F nor not-F has
been proved by the preponderance of the evidence is also an empiri-
cal question. There is no good research on the subject. Neverthe-
less, the Court has acted as if it believes that the bare burden of
persuasion has important consequences for factfinding, 58 and some
Where the ordinary civil standard of proof is applicable, this may identify the party with
the burden. However, another standard of proof may require a rule that furnishes a
solution if the trier is uncertain whether the standard is satisfied or not. This rule, in
turn, might resolve the issue against either party, not just the party whose standard of
proof is higher. Perhaps the most unusual description of the burden of persuasion yet
proposed is a combination of the idea that the burden pertains to quandaries of the trier
with the idea that the burden admits of degrees. See Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales
ofJustice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE LJ. 1299, 1300-01 (1977). This
strange conception of the burden of persuasion serves only the special purposes of its
author.
56 Compare MobileJ. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910) with Western &
At. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929).
57 Compare Mullaney, 421 U.S. 628 with Patterson, 432 U.S. 197.
58 See supra note 56 and 57. See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958). In
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, the Court upheld a legal presumption of defendant railroad's
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lawyers agree.59 An alternative modified p-bar analysis accomo-
dates this belief.
The belief is founded on a special assumption about factfinders'
evaluations of evidence: in a significant number of trials, the
factfinder will stand paralyzed, unable to discern a relevant differ-
ence between one party's proof of F and the other's proof of not-F.
More particularly, in these trials the factfinder will be unable to say
either that plaintiff has proved F by the preponderance of evidence
or that defendant has proved not-F by the preponderance of evi-
dence. Call this the indiscernibility assumption. It can be accomo-
dated easily by adding another set of p-bars to the scale that is used
in the basic analysis of data about factfinders' evaluations. This set
of p-bars marks the number of trials in which factfinders are unwill-
ing to assign any of the six canonical evaluations to Proof/F. In-
stead, they give it a seventh evaluation: (X) neither F proved POE
nor not-F proved POE. It is understood what having projectable
data about these quandaries would be like, and there is no special
difficulty in the idea that these data are sorted between trials in
which F actually exists and trials in which not-F actually exists.
Therefore, addition of this seventh set of p-bars still serves the pro-
gram of the basic analysis.
The actual magnitude of the X bars for any issue is an empirical
matter. However, some suppositions, again, are reasonable. It may
still be assumed that triers' deliberations are efficacious and, in par-
ticular, that their evaluations are fairly acute. Therefore, the relative
number of trials that leave factfinders in quandaries, though signifi-
cant, is small for most issues. 60 Furthermore, if the set of trials sup-
negligence based on a showing that the accident involved railroad equipment and re-
sulted in death. In Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, the Court invalidated a rule that shifted the
burden of persuasion for the issue of negligence from plaintiff to defendant railroad on
a showing of the same facts. In both cases, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
of proof was applicable to the negligence issue, and the party who had to satisfy the
standard for his side of the issue bore the burden of persuasion. Thus, there is only one
practical difference between the two rules. Only if the jury found that neither defend-
ant's proof nor plaintiff's proof satisfied the standard would the two rules make a differ-
ence in the result: under the Turnipseed presumption, defendant would prevail; with the
Henderson shift of burden, plaintiff would prevail. The Court's treatment of this differ-
ence as crucial implies the belief that the allocation of a bare burden of persuasion has a
significant influence on the outcome of trials. See also Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585
(1976).
59 J. MAGUIRE,J. WEINSTEINJ. CHADBOURN &J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 1008 (6th ed. 1973). This belief is controversial. See generally C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 12, § 336.
60 "No extended experience at the bar or upon the trial bench is required to produce
a vivid realization that only in the ... rarer instances is [the jury's] determination based
upon the allocation of the burden of persuasion." Morgan, supra note 36, at 59. See also
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plying data for the basic analysis is assumed to be similar in other
respects to the set of trials supplying data for this alternative analy-
sis, the numbers represented by the bars of set X will decrease the
numbers represented by sets A and A'. The supposed results of
modified analysis for ordinary civil trials of issue F have the form of
Figure 8. It illustrates that allocation of the bare burden of persua-
sion to plaintiffs distributes erroneous findings markedly in favor of
defendants. Allocation of the burden to defendants would have
equal and opposite consequences.
SOP
Number I
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Factfinders" Evaluations of Proof/F
FIGURE 8
The existence and extent of indiscernibility in trials by common
law standards of proof is a crucial issue of legislative fact. If indis-
cernibility is not assumed, lawmaking for the bare burden of persua-
sion is idle. Only the indiscernibility assumption and related other
assumptions can support lawmaking to enforce a policy for errors by
allocation of the bare burden of persuasion. The assumption is du-
bious and controversial, yet the Court, in such lawmaking, has
neither argued for it nor even advanced it clearly. Therefore, even
though due process requires that rules for burdens of proof dis-
tribute errors or risks of error according to the relative interests at
stake in trials of fact, the Court's rulemaking has ignored a crucial
part of the rationale.
C. THE BEYOND-A-REASONABLE-DOUBT STANDARD
In truth, assumptions of the kind that underlie p-bar analysis
Jaffe, supra note 30, at 10; Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L. REV. 153,
191 (1944). Compare Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, supra, at 191 n.89 with C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 322 at 686 (1954). Turnipseed, 219
U.S. 35, and Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, which seem to show a contrary view from the
Supreme Court, see supra note 58, are both negligence cases. See Morgan, Choice of Law
Governing Proof, supra, at 180, in which the author states: "The practical importance of
fixing the burden of persuasion seems to have impressed courts and commentators
more forcibly in negligence cases than in other litigation." Because the "fact" of negli-
gence may not admit of probability or likelihood, see supra note 7, the factfinders' sense
of relative likelihood is blunted, and they fall into significantly more quandaries about
negligence than about other issues.
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are all crucial issues of legislative fact for standards of proof. If find-
ings about issue F are decisive in some kinds of criminal trials and
assumptions about triers' evaluations of Proof/F indicate p-bars
similar to those in either Figure 6 or Figure 8, then the Court's re-
quirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt will ensure that no
innocent defendant is convicted. But, nine out of ten guilty defend-
ants will be acquitted. Maybe the principles of fairness associated
with due process permit, or even require, this result.
On the other hand, the Court has recognized that the innocent
defendant may fairly be subjected to some risk of erroneous convic-
tion, provided that the risk is justified. 61 The state's interest in con-
victing the guilty provides such justification. 62 Indeed, the state's
interest may well justify a one-in-ten chance of erroneous convic-
tion. .If so, the requirement that F be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt is excessive. As Figure 9 shows, proof by clear and convinc-
ing evidence exposes the innocent to ajustifiable risk. Furthermore,
the apportionment of erroneous verdicts at seven to one in favor of
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FIGURE 9
A convincing rationale for the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in criminal trials must deal with issues of ends and
means. It needs not only sound brief for Blackstonian political mo-
rality, but also an argument that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard of proof is necessary to realize the moral ideal. Such a
rationale has not been offered, but it could be. As for ends, Black-
stone's principle may be so well-established a conception of fair play
and substantial justice that the Court's acceptance of it is unim-
peachable. Due process may demand that errors be distributed in a
10:1 ratio favorable to the accused. As for means to this end, an
61 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 208.
62 Id.
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argument for the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard must address
the issues of legislative fact that underlie p-bar analysis.
There are very good reasons to assume that factfinders' evalua-
tions of Proof/F in criminal trials differ from their evaluations of
Proof/F in ordinary civil trials. For example, a criminal defendant is
ordinarily brought to trial only after a preliminary finding of prob-
able cause for the charge. Moreover, the resources and abilities of
the parties are ordinarily unequal, with the advantage belonging to
the state. Although it is assumed that F is a genuinely controversial
issue, that just half of the defendants are actually guilty, and that
triers do better than a coin-toss, it should not be supposed that p-
bars for F resemble those of Figure 6 or Figure 8. The special char-
acteristics of ordinary criminal trials imply that factfinders will give
higher evaluations to Proof/F, even in cases in which the defendants
are actually innocent. It may well be supposed, therefore, that p-
bars for F resemble the p-bars in Figure 10. If so, proof of F beyond
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FIGURE 10
D. THE CLEAR-AND-CONVINCING-EVIDENCE STANDARD
The Court's requirement that some facts be proved by clear
and convincing evidence also needs reason in policy and empirical
considerations. It was speculated that the Court's policy for errors
in proceedings for involuntary civil commitment and proceedings
for termination of parental rights calls for a three-to-one apportion-
ment in favor of defendants. 63 This policy will not be served by the
prescribed standard of proof if factfinders' evaluations of proof con-
form to our assumptions about ordinary civil trials. Figure 9 shows
that the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard will distribute er-
rors in a ratio of seven to one. For all the Court has said, this policy
63 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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may be the actual policy for errors in such cases. However, nothing
in the Court's opinions shows that the relative interests of defend-
ants weigh heavy enough to justify such a policy. If the Court's law-
making has a tenable rationale, it is found as much in special
assumptions about factfinders' evaluations of proof as in special pol-
icies for errors.
The Court has had an inkling of this. In Santosky v. Kramer,64 the
Court described characteristics of New York's state-initiated perma-
nent neglect proceeding to show how "numerous factors combine
to magnify the risk of erroneous factfinding." 65 These included:
the vague substantive standards and a tendency to bias; the inequal-
ity of the litigants' resources, skills, and access to evidence; and a
one-sided ability to shape the historical record. 66 Not all of these
characteristics are relevant to factfinders' evaluations of proof; the
third, for example, is related to entrapment. But, unchecked bias
and litigational power, combined in opposition to the defendant
parents, are rightly assumed to cause relatively higher evaluations of
Proof/Neglect, even in cases in which no neglect actually exists.
Furthermore, assuming that these factors are not offset by others, a
standard of proof higher than the preponderance of the evidence
may be needed to apportion erroneous findings as policy requires.
Therefore, it may well be supposed that the data on triers' evalua-
tions of Proof/Neglect are displayed by Figure 11, where the re-
quirement of clear and convincing evidence is shown to apportion
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FIGURE 11
The form of the argument in Santosky suggests that the Court
has recognized, if only vaguely, that its lawmaking for burdens of
proof needs better rationalization. Although due process requires
that the standard of proof enforce a policy for factfinding errors that
corresponds to the relative interests at stake in certain kinds of tri-
64 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
65 Id. at 762.
66 Id. at 762-63.
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als, 67 the policy alone does not justify the adoption of any particular
standard of proof. Justification also demands tenable assumptions
about the trials' general characteristics, and a sound argument that
these characteristics will affect the distribution of factfinders' evalua-
tions of proof in a particular way. Good reasoning in favor of some
standard of proof needs not only well-founded conclusions about
policy, but also well-founded conclusions about legislative fact. The
Santosky opinion is closer to satisfying these demands.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR DUE PROCESS
Implicit in the preceding argument is an explication of lawmak-
ing for burdens of proof. As such, it is a model of rationality in
lawmaking, and it is also a reconstruction of actual practice. Com-
mentators note that burdens of proof are founded on considerations
of policy. 68 These considerations are explicated by the policy for
factfinders' erroneous decisions as a wanted ratio of errors. Com-
mentators note also that burdens of proof are founded on such con-
siderations as probability and relative access to evidence. 69 These
considerations are explicated by the general assumptions about tri-
als of an issue that may warrant special assumptions about
factfinders' evaluations of proof.
The model is adequate, notwithstanding any controversy about
the particular assumptions of legislative fact or the particular poli-
cies for errors adopted in the preceding illustrations. Its adequacy
does not depend on the assumptions' truth or the policies' accept-
ance; nor does it depend on judgments about the reasonability of
these assumptions or policies. Rather, the model is adequate as an
acceptable logic of lawmaking for standards of proof. As such, the
model serves due process review of burdens of proof. It makes
plain the relation of lawmaking for burdens of proof to the tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice associated with due
process.
The general form of constitutional challenges to burdens of
proof is apparent. A burden of proof is inconsistent with due pro-
cess only if it apportions factfinding errors in an impermissible way.
Perhaps some allocations of the burden of proof belong to catego-
ries that justify presumptions of unconstitutionality. A sucessful at-
tack on any other allocation of the burden of proof, however,
67 See supra note 3.
68 F. James & G. Hazard, supra note 55, § 7.8, at 324-25; C. MCCORMICK, supra note
12, § 337, at 952; Cleary, supra note 36, at 11-13; Morgan, Some Observations Concerning
Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REv. 906, 910-11 (1931).
69 See supra note 68.
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requires two things. First, it must establish a set of reasonable as-
sumptions about trials in which the standard of proof is applied to
an issue, upon which suppositions about factfinders' evaluations of
proof may be based. Second, it must show that, upon any such tena-
ble suppositions, the challenged standard of proof would apportion
errors about the issue in a ratio that violates due process principles.
If reasonable assumptions of legislative fact make it appear that the
challenged standard apportions errors in a ratio consistent with due
process principles, then the attack fails.
This Article offers no theory of reasonability for assumptions of
legislative fact. The preceding discussion has exhibited the form
and content of such assumptions. It need only be said again that the
truth of such assumptions is an empirical matter, though their ap-
propriateness and acceptability may be also a matter of ideology.
Nor does this Article offer a theory of due process principles gov-
erning the apportionment of errors, though more should be said
about how such principles may be critiqued.
If someone may be deprived of life, liberty, or property upon a
finding of fact at issue in a trial, the burden of proof for that fact
must be consistent with due process. Regarding policy for errors,
due process implicates general principles of efficiency and fairness.
The burden of proof, therefore, should serve to minimize errors,
subject to constraints of distributive justice on the errors' incidence.
These constraints are a matter of individual right to fair treatment.
Lawmaking for burdens of proof is thereby bound to adopt a policy
that shows respect for differences of interests affected by factfinding
errors. Although no person has a right to a burden of proof that
apportions errors in any particular ratio, he has a right to a burden
of proof allocated upon consideration of his stake by a disinterested
lawmaker whose deliberations are guided by a defensible theory of
value. If the lawmaker has thereupon adopted a policy for errors
about the issue of fact, this policy satisfies the requirements of due
process.
The Court's several policies for errors may well be satisfactory.
However, acceptance of any apparent policy of the Court is not ac-
ceptance of it as required by due process. The traditional principles
ofjustice and fairness associated with due process may be generous
enough to accomodate a range of policies for errors, any of which
would pass constitutional muster. Furthermore, it would be wrong
to assume that all issues in trials of some kind should be treated
alike, so that, for example, erroneous findings about all facts neces-
sary for criminal convictions are subject to the same policy.
In this light, the Court's review of burdens of proof in criminal
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trials appears even more inappropriate. As a matter of course, the
Court has ignored special considerations of legislative fact that may
support an allocation of the burden of proof to enforce an accepta-
ble policy. The Court has also ignored the special considerations of
justice or fairness that may support a policy for errors about some
element, even though that policy is less favorable to the criminal
defendant. Because of its assumption that triers evaluate evidence
with Bayesian rationality and that there is general proportional uni-
formity between the different interests at stake, the Court has or-
dained the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof for all
elements of a crime. 70 The consequences for due process jurispru-
dence have been appalling. A legislature's deviation from the
Court's ordinance, which may well be justified by reasonable as-
sumptions about factfinders' evaluations of proof or special consid-
erations of distributive fairness in the apportionment of errors,
engages only formal criteria to determine whether or not the af-
fected material fact is an "element."
The theory of due process needs an acceptable model of law-
making for burdens of proof-a model that accomodates fair, spe-
cific policies for errors and reasonable, specific assumptions of
legislative fact. When due process review of burdens of proof is
concerned with each of these two elements and is constrained by an
appropriate deference to legislative judgment within well-founded
theories of fairness and reasonability, the Court's lawmaking activity
may end.
70 Winship, 397 U.S. at 361.
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